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Abstract—Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and
automated vehicle applications based on embedded sensors have
become a reality today. As road vehicles increase its autonomy
and the driver shares its role in the control loop, novel challenges
on their dependability assessment arise. One key issue is that the
notion of controllability becomes more complex when validating
the robustness of the automated vehicle in the presence of
faults. This paper presents a simulation-based fault injection
approach aimed at finding acceptable controllability properties
for the model-based design of control systems. We focus on
determining the best fault models inserting exceptional conditions
to accelerate the identification of specific areas for testing. In
our work we performed fault injection method to find the most
appropriate safety concepts, controllability properties and fault
handling strategies at early design phases of lateral control
functions based on the error in the Differential GPS signal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated vehicle technology has the potential to redefine
the automotive world and will definitely bring major benefits
for road safety, emissions and congestions. With the growth of
control complexity and the reduction of the drivers role, many
challenges arise with respect to the safety and controllability
risk assessment of these vehicles. Therefore, additional focus
needs to be given to smart safety concepts [1], such as
the accounting of stringent new conditions when performing
hazard analysis. The most critical vehicle functions demand
fail-operational behaviour, as the system cannot simply shut
down silently, i.e. fail-silent behaviour is not acceptable for
highly automated driving. Thus to reach the highest safety-
critical levels, such systems should work on a fail-operational
manner achieved by either redundancy or alternative functions.
Furthermore, traditional validation and verification methods
might not be sufficient, especially to perform combinations of
exceptions in unusual operation conditions. A promising ap-
proach to overcome this limitation is Fault Injection (FI)[2][3].
Svenningson[4]investigated how to benefit from conduct-
ing fault injection experiments on behavioural models of
software. This approach is defined as model-implemented
fault injection, since a model is extended with artefacts to
support the injection of fault effects during simulation. In
particular, it addressed injection of hardware fault effects into
Simulink models. Another similar approach is introduced in
[5]. The FISCADE fault injection tool is developed as a
plug-in to SCADE (Safety-Critical Application Development
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Environment) and it automatically replaces original operators
with fault injection nodes. However, the fault effects are not
considered at level of vehicle dynamics. This is of particular
interest when calculating critical parameters such as the Fault
Tolerant Time Interval (FTTI), which is directly related to
the controllability of the vehicle. In [6], Silveira introduced a
Matlab/Simulink-based co-simulation framework for evaluat-
ing the stability of electrical vehicles using fault injection. This
latter work did not analysed controllability challenges and fail-
operational issues, which are relevant factors for automated
driving.
The work underlying this paper intends to develop a
simulation-based fault injection framework to: (i) get testing
data regarding failure modes and failure effects of automated
critical functions as a way to complement standard safety
analysis techniques, (ii) calculate the FTTI which is directly
related to the controllability of vehicles, (iii) evaluate and
improve the robustness of automated functions, and (iv) obtain
trade-off evaluation results between safety and cost issues,
already at concept level. Our approach has been evaluated in
a use case of a lateral control function for an urban vehicle.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we present the relevant background w.r.t fault in-
jection in automated driving. Thereafter, Section III describes
our simulation-based fault injection approach. Afterwards, a
use case targeting lateral control is explained in Section IV.
Finally, Section V presents conclusions leading to an outlook
on future work.
II. FAULT INJECTION IN AUTOMATED DRIVING
Among the unique challenges of designing automated cars
is ensuring the ability to avoid a specified harm or damage
through the timely reactions of the vehicle, assuming the driver
is out of the loop. We refer to this ability as controllability[7].
ISO 26262 introduced a similar controllability definition, but
centred on the drivers ability to control the vehicle. The next
version of ISO 26262 will need to adjust the controllability
definition to highly automated driving. Our work pursues
the testing technologies that can predict: (1) the acceptable
controllability properties (such as computation delays) for a
given electronic architecture, (2) what additional design areas
related to dependability assurance must be improved or added,
and (3) whether we need to concentrate more testing in specific
areas to guarantee the robustness of the vehicle against harms.
In particular, controllability is directly related to the time-
span in which a fault or faults can be present in a system
before a hazardous event occurs. This parameter is referred
as FTTI and can be better understood with an example for
the Fault-Error-Failure chain of the lateral control due to a
Differential GPS(DGPS) component failure, as shown in Fig.1.
This parameter is crucial when calculating the maximum time
for system reconfiguration (instead of a simply shut-down)
before a hazardous event occurs.
Fig. 1: Fault-Error-Failure Chain and FTTI definition
A. Primer on Fault Injection
In order to better understand the role of FI on safety
assessment, a theoretical background on this field is essential.
This technique either evaluates or validates the dependability
of systems [8]. Dependability of a computer-based system is
the ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent
and more severe than acceptable [9]. By exploiting such a
testing technique, controlled experiments are conducted by the
deliberate injection of faults into the system and the reaction
is observed. Its main objectives are to: (i) understand the
systems behaviour under the effects of real faults, (ii) evaluate
the system fault tolerance, (iii) forecast the faulty behaviour
of the target system, (iv) identify weak links on the design,
and (v) estimate the coverage and latency of Fault Tolerance
Mechanisms (FTM). Actually, as they are not triggered under
normal conditions, FI is used to activate those exceptional
conditions and to remove FTM design faults. A detailed
description of the different FI techniques and tools is presented
in [10]. One of the techniques with more relevant benefits
is the so-called simulation or model-based FI which allows
full observability and controllability. To get meaningful and
accurate FI experiment results, a representative fault model
is required. Different types of faults can appear depending
on its nature during the system design process or during its
operational life [10].
B. Fault Injection requirements in ISO 26262
ISO 26262 recommends the use of FI in different phases of
the V model, including both sides of the V-cycle. The main aim
of FI on the left side is to check that behavioural specifications
do not contain any error or omission in the presence of faults.
In general, FI helps to ensure that the system implements the
appropriate safety mechanisms that prevent the violation of
safety properties [11]. The right side of the V-cycle stresses
the verification and validation of safety mechanisms. FI is
mentioned at system, HW and SW level. At system level, faults
are injected into the item by reproducing the possible item
malfunctions. This is done to evaluate different safety concepts
and safety mechanisms, since these last ones are not invoked
during normal operation of the system. This is one of the main
emphases of our work. We aim at evaluating different safety
concepts based on specific FTTI controllability parameters by
simulating item malfunctions in the presence of representative
fault models.
III. SIMULATION-BASED FAULT INJECTION APPROACH
A. Generic Framework
As previously pointed out, one of the main aims of our sim-
ulation environment extension is to evaluate properties such as
controllability and to trade-off between system dependability
attributes and cost already at concept level. To do so, those
parameters are evaluated via a simulated vehicle. The Dy-
nacar platform[12] is a real-time vehicle dynamics simulation
SW solution based on multiple domains vehicle models. It
provides a high-fidelity vehicle physics simulation basing a
multibody dynamics models (i.e.: engine, ransmission, steering
system, braking system, aerodynamics). It permits a real-
time simulations, either HW or SW functionalities, combined
with its notable modularity and interfacing options. Hence it
allows the mixing of virtual or real ECUs, vehicle sensors and
vehicle control variables. The FTTI of an item must remain
within the limits given by physical properties of the respective
functionality e.g., the maximal time span the lateral control
is allowed not to be under control without losing vehicle
controllability.
The system under test is developed as part of a model-
based design control function development. Due to the benefits
of using this method, an early verification and validation of the
developed automated critical vehicle function can be achieved.
In fact, model-implemented FI technique is used where faults
are introduced via model blocks i.e. saboteours and can be
inserted into either SW or system models. This allows to
inject different errors such as timing, control flow or data
by extending behavioural models with FI blocks. It is worth
noting that the proposed solution is independent of the selected
commercial model-based environment.
On the basis of the so-called FARM (Fault, Activation,
Readouts, Measures) model[13], a simulation-based FI frame-
work is proposed. FARM methodology emerges as an ef-
fective way to characterize such a environment and follows
the subsequent process: a Fault characterized by a model,
a location, an injection time and a duration is injected into
the system. Depending on the executed workload, fault
activation trajectories might differ i.e., activation trajectories
specifies how the system is functionally exercised during the
experiment. Another important significant variable to define is
where to observe systems behaviour under fault. This is the
main objective of Readouts parameter. Once that those results
are logged, Measures are calculated so the final dependability
of the system can be evaluated.
In addition to the FARM model, another well established
FI concept is set up as basis of our approach. Bearing in mind
that the selected method is based on a simulation environment,
a good approach to automate these experiments is to compare
a fault-free or golden simulation versus as many as faulty ones
the designer would consider necessary. The faulty simulation
flow usually consists of three main phases[14][15]: pre-FI,
FI and post-FI. The main framework blocks are illustrated in
Fig.2.
Fig. 2: Simulation-Based Fault Injection Framework: Generic
Approach
• Pre-Fault Injection Phase
– Fault list: this library is created based on a framework
environment: Fault Model, Fault Location or Signal
Target, FI Time and Fault Duration. Parsing of the de-
sign can be applied addressing two different objectives:
introduction of faults in random signals or verification
that the signal chosen as potential target after conduct-
ing the safety analysis, exists. This approach should
be able to model any type of the aforementioned faults
i.e. permanent, intermittent and transient.
– Scenario library: The user can select the vehicle sce-
nario to test the correspondent fault list. Speed and
initial position of the vehicle can be specified.
– Fault injector (F): This module injects the previously
selected fault from the fault list and the user selected
scenario into the vehicle model. Depending on the
selected solution, simulator commands or saboteours
techniques might be applied.
• Fault Injection Phase
– This process is controlled by the Fault injector. System
Behavioural Models are run following golden-versus-
fault simulations approach.
– Data collector: This functionality performs data collec-
tion. We only collect data from which their values are
suitable for us.
• Post-Fault Injection Phase
– Result analyzer: Compare and analyze the recollected
data of the faulty target. After this analysis, the fault
tolerance level that the system requires can be deter-
mined together with the coverage of those mechanisms.
B. Framework in terms of ISO 26262
Regarding safety assessment in the context of ISO 26262,
the aforementioned approach can be used to address the
following objectives:
• Safety verification and validation: support or completely
proceed with the safety verification and validation of the
technical solutions at the different levels of Model, SW,
HW-in-the-Loop and vehicle tests by accomplishing an
early verification and validation of safety concepts;
• Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA): by re-
producing a specific driving scenario it is possible to
verify that the study done at analysis level is correct and
complete. Furthermore, as it is not always an easy task
to determine the controllability value of a specific traffic
situation, simulating driving scenarios helps the safety
engineer to determine the controllability in a more precise
way. This is especially relevant in highly automated
driving, based on the automation level of the Standard
SAE J3016.
• Safety Analysis: As previously pointed out, analytical
results are sometimes not sufficient and techniques such
as Failure modes and Effect Analysis(FMEA) must be
either verified or completed by FI tests.
• FTTI: calculated by measuring the time frame between
the inserted fault and the lost of controllability (delay
between the fault activation and the violation of a safety
goal). If the time constraints derived from the FTTI
experiments are so tight, then redundancy might be
needed for those components/systems considered as
potential fault source. As consequence,a possible safe
state, wrapped up by testing data, can be derived
IV. USE CASE: LATERAL CONTROL
A. Automated vehicle control architecture
Nowadays, the algorithms embedded in automated driv-
ing applications are marked by the integration of different
subsystems on a modular architecture. This separation in
different modules reduces the time of troubleshooting possible
failures. The architecture used in the framework of the current
contribution is shown in 3 and it has the six common mod-
ules of automated vehicle control architecture[16]. Those are
acquisition, perception, communication, decision, control and
actuators. Cooperative maneuvers are not considered in the
work, so communication block will be considered in future
applications:
• Acquisition: It gathers the information of the different
sensors in the vehicle. Position, speed, among others
are obtained from sensors like DGPS, odometry, Inertial
Measurement Units (IMU), lasers, among others (real
vehicle) or the simulation. For the purposes of the current
Fig. 3: Control Architecture for automated Vehicles
approach the information of the Differential GPS + IMU
is relevant, because it is related with the calculation of
the lateral error.
• Perception: The perception module gather the information
from the acquisition module, to process this data and to
give reliable information of the positioning and obstacle
around.
• Decision: This module generates the trajectories that are
tracked by the vehicle as in [17], and [18]. Based on this
information and the GPS position is calculated the lateral
error that will be used in the lateral control law.
• Control: The control module receives the data from the
decision and it process this information to send the
steering, acceleration and braking assignments to the low
level on the vehicle (actuators) or simulation.
– Longitudinal control: it controls the acceleration and
braking assignments in the vehicle.
– Lateral control: the main functionality of the lateral
control is to control the steering wheel using as refer-
ence the lateral error. Different control laws have been
used in previous works [19] and [17]. The control law
used in this work includes the lateral error, but also the
angular and the curvature, as in [18]:
Cv = K1 ∗ elat +K2 ∗ eang +K3 ∗ Curvature (1)
This part of the architecture is relevant for the purposes
of the current work. It receives the injection of faulty
signal on the steering reference and the introduction
of faulty GPS signals to produce wrong calculation
of the lateral error that will have a reaction on the
steering. This is made with the main goal of producing
an evaluation of the function robustness in terms of the
controllability.
• Simulation model, Sensors, Actuators: On the current
approach, the tests have been made using a dynamic
model simulation platform of the vehicle (Dynacar) to
test the architecture and how it responds against failures.
• Manual driving: The architecture considers, additionally,
the interaction with a human driver in the control loop.
B. Pre-Fault Injection Phase
This phase covers the tasks of completing the fault list. To
do so, as depicted in Figure 9, a safety analysis (at concept
and system level) has been used as starting point. In this way,
the possible fault list is collapsed and only potential faults
are taken under consideration. Of course this is extensible to
some other component failures and not only to the DGPS +
IMU input. Regarding the HARA, a driving situation where
the vehicle is driving at 45km/h maximum in a city with fluent
traffic and performing the steering manoeuvre in a curve at a
city intersection is assumed as the most relevant scenario.
When calculating the ASIL(Automotive Safety Integrity
Level), the Severity(S) is considered as S2. The reason behind
is that as it is more than 10% probable that the vehicle
gets involved in a pedestrian/bicycle accident where people
could result in severe but nor life-threatening injuries. The
exposure (E )is E4 as it is an average manoeuvre. The
controllability specification is a special parameter, as ideally
automated driving proposes no driver backup to take control
of the vehicle when a hazardous event occurs; however for
the use case we are considering a driver could take control
of the vehicle in around 1 second. This time response is
based on the average measures from the Autonomous Vehicle
Disengagement Reports in [20].
The PASS/FAIL criteria of the simulation results is defined
as the safety goal ”avoid unwanted lateral control when
Lateral Error is LateralErrormax”. Lane deviation criteria is
calculated in the following way:
Lateral Errormax=(Lane Width-Vehicle Width)/2=(2,5-
1,19)/2=0,655 m
Fig. 4: Lane Derivation Criteria
C. Fault Injection Phase
The selected failure modes are toggled by introducing extra
behavioural models reproducing those faults at the appropriate
injection time. These saboteurs trigger the faults and full
access points are possible. They effectively represent different
failure modes of the DGPS and lateral control. By applying
the process explained in Section III, a golden simulation for
each of the selected experiments has been created and different
faulty ones representing the previous circumstances. It is worth
noting that even if Simulink has been chosen, this approach
can be implemented on some other languages as SCADE.
Figure 5 illustrates golden and faulty values of the target signal
X and Y of the DGPS.
Fig. 5: Simulation results, target signal X,Y
D. Post-Fault Injection and Results
The result analyser evaluates the collected data based on
the PASS/FAIL criteria of each set of experiments. To do so,
the results of the so-called golden simulation (without any
injected faults) are compared versus faulty ones based on
the set read-outs of the experiments, i.e., measurable vehicle
dynamics parameters (Yaw Rate Change, Derivation from
lane center change or lateral accelerations. Fig. 6 depicts the
safety analysis and the collection of the results for faults
introduced in X,Y DGPS signals and in the steering(see
Fig. 3). To get the value of FTTI, different fault durations
are tested and this double criteria is checked: lateral error
shall not exceed 0,655 m value and the steering shall not be
saturated.
Fig. 6: FTTI (ms) simulation results for different fault injection
experiments
In the evaluation of safety concepts, we can consider
the worst case scenarios in Steering and acquisition outputs
(FTTI 645ms and 625 respectively, see Fig. 6). Both values
are similar (less than 2 cycles of the low level frequency,
fixed at 10 ms) due to the processing time of the Decision
and control block, when failures on DGPS are detected. On
the other hand, the processing time of more complex dynamic
conditions, for instance when the stuck at the steering at -1
and 1, even if the maximum lateral angular speed is limited.
In this case, the resulting value is higher than in the other
cases because of the dynamics of the wheels. One of the
main outcomes is that the lateral control system can tolerate
a permanent DGPS failure for 177 ms without losing vehicle
controllability. In the same way, the assumed potential failure
effects have been verified for the Lateral Control.
Fig. 7: GPS Fault behaviour
Fig. 8: Steering Fault behaviour
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a simulation-based FI approach for
safety assessment of automated vehicle functions. Our ap-
proach has been evaluated on a use case for the model-based
design of a lateral control function embedded in an urban
vehicle. From a novelty standpoint, we focused on the de-
termination of the fault detection interval for permanent faults
based on the maximum lateral error and steering saturation,
as a vehicle controllability property. A major strength of the
method introduced in this paper is its integration with HARA
activities, which enables a seamless ISO 26262-compliant
safety assessment process. Our future work spans the spectrum
from relaxing the fault simulation constraints to instrumenting
the automated assessment work. This includes: (1) to add the
capability of collapsing and automating the injection of faults
at post-processing stage, (2) the definition of generic fault
models to be ready available in a database, (3) the evaluation of
the acceptable time for switching the control to the driver while
keeping controllability, and (4) to increase the automation of
the full fault injection process from HARA to the generation
of assessment reports.
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